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ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES FOR THE '90s:
GOLDEN-CHEEKED WARBLERS AND
YELLOWFIN TUNA'
Ernest E. Smith2
Environmental issues have transformed the areas of law that I
have taught for the last thirty-one years. A decade ago environmen-
tal law went virtually unmentioned in courses in property, domestic
oil and gas law, and international transactions. By 1995 environ-
mental concerns had moved from the periphery to center stage in
these legal fields. To someone who teaches and writes about these
subjects, the clearest manifestation of this development has been
that virtually every first-year property casebook, 3 mining or oil and
gas law casebook,4 and international business transactions
casebook, written in the last five years now includes segments on
environmental law. In many older casebooks that have been revised
within this period, environmental coverage frequently has appeared
for the first time.6
1. This article is based on the Godfrey Lecture the Author delivered at the
University of Maine School of Law on November 17, 1994. The Author wishes to
acknowledge the honor bestowed on him by being selected the 1994 Godfrey
Distinguished Visiting Professor. It was a special privilege to hold a Professorship
named for the distinguished former dean of the Maine School of Law, Edward S.
Godfrey. The Author also would like to express his appreciation for the hospitality
shown him by Dean Donald Zillman and the faculty of the Maine School of Law, as
well as for the opportunity to have taught both the students in his first-year property
class and an upper division course in protection of wilderness and wildlife.
Although the views expressed in this article are solely those of the Author, several of
these ideas originated in discussions with Maine students both during and after class.
2. Rex G. Baker Centennial Chair in Natural Resources Law, University of Texas
School of Law; Godfrey Distinguished Visiting Professor, University of Maine
School of Law, 1994-95; B.A., Southern Methodist University, 1958; LL.B., Harvard
Law School, 1962.
3. E.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 614-15, 776-80, 986-
89 (3d ed. 1993); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND
PRACTICES 633-40 (1993).
4. E.g., BARLOW BURKE, JR., Er AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON MINERAL LAW
505-698 (1994); RICHARD C. MAXWELL ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE
LAW OF OIL AND GAS 117-20, 1025-39 (6th ed. 1992).
5. E.g., JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL Eco-
NOMIC RELATIONS 559-95 (3d ed. 1995); ERNEST E. SMrrT ET AL., MATERIALS ON
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM TRANSACTIONS 556-64 (1993) [hereinafter INTr'L PE.
TROLEUM TRANSACTIONS].
6. E.g., JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN
PROPERTY LAW (3d ed. 1994); JOHN E. CRIBBET Er AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
PROPERTY (6th ed. 1990); EUGENE 0. KUNTz Er AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
OIL AND GAS LAW (2d ed. 1993).
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But correspondingly, as environmental law and regulations have
assumed greater importance, resistance and opposition to them also
have increased. One form of that opposition has come from analo-
gous theoretical sources: absolutist claims of freedom from external
interference in making decisions within one's own territory. Do-
mestically, the opposition has been based on constitutional protec-
tion of property rights; internationally, it has been based on
protection and vindication of national sovereignty. To both practic-
ing lawyers and academic theoreticians, these parallel developments
will present some of the most significant environmental issues of the
decade-within our nation and beyond.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN REAL ESTATE
AND INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS
Although environmental issues now extend across virtually the
entire legal spectrum, their rapidly growing importance can be illus-
trated by briefly examining two rather specialized fields: real estate
and international transactions.
A. Environmental Law and the Real Estate Lawyer
To the domestic real estate lawyer, environmental regulations
have become almost as important as taxation as the major external
factor that drives land transactions and private land use planning.
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA) 7 is an example of how profoundly a single
environmental statute can affect real estate. Under the statute, cur-
rent and prior landowners, along with the companies that produce
and transport hazardous substances, may be held strictly liable for
the cost of cleaning up a hazardous waste disposal site.8 This poten-
tial liability has had repercussions for virtually every step of the real
estate transaction.
The impact of CERCLA is especially obvious with respect to a
purchaser's ability to obtain financing. Any lending institution must
be concerned both about the value of the property securing the loan
and its own potential liability. If a loan is secured by land that is
later discovered to be environmentally contaminated, the value of
the security promptly disappears. If the environmental contamina-
tion is discovered after the borrower defaults and the lending insti-
tution has foreclosed on the property, the lender faces other dire
possibilities.
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988) (listing "potentially responsible parties," recover-
able costs, etc.).
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Every lending institution in the country is certainly familiar with
United States v. Maryland Bank and Trust Co.9 A bank made a
$335,000 mortgage loan that it foreclosed when the borrower de-
faulted. After the bank took title to the land, it discovered that it
had acquired a contaminated waste site, along with CERCLA liabil-
ities for clean up costs that totalled well over $500,000.10 Although
the statute since has been amended to protect persons who acquire
property without reason to know that it is contaminated,11 a fore-
closing bank still faces effective loss of its security if the land is a
hazardous waste site as well as potential liability to a new purchaser
if it is aware of the contamination and transfers ownership without
disclosing this information to the purchaser.
Even apart from the financing problem, a purchaser's risk of lia-
bility has added costs to the land transaction in the form of environ-
mental assessments. The statutory exemption for purchasers who
buy property without "reason to know" that it is a hazardous waste
site has created an entirely new profession devoted to environmen-
tal "due diligence."' 2 Environmental assessments are conducted for
prospective buyers to determine the identity of all previous owners
and occupants of the property and all its previous uses. Chemical
tests are done on suspicious property to discover possible
contamination. 1
3
Further, CERCLA has led to at least one additional step in nego-
tiations for purchase. Negotiations for allocation of the risk of
CERCLA liability are becoming an increasingly common part of
many real estate transactions.' 4 The extent to which CERCLA ac-
tually allows the shifting of risk and whether private agreements are
as valuable as buyers and sellers (or their lawyers) seem to believe
9. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D.Md. 1986).
10. Id. at 575-76.
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(35)(A), 9607(b)(3) (1988).
12. See, e.g., Carolyn M. Brown, Environmental Liabilities and the Innocent
Landowner, 10 E. MIN. L. FouND. § 2.01, §§ 2.05(c)-2.06 (1989) for a discussion of
the types of consultants used by real estate purchasers to establish the innocent land-
owner defense under CERCLA. For comment on the environmental auditing-con-
suiting business generally, see Terrell E. Hunt and Timothy A. Wilkins,
Environmental Audits and Enforcement Policy, 16 HARV. ENvr'L L. REv. 365
(1992).
13. The statute provides that "[t]o establish that the defendant had no reason to
know... the defendant must have undertaken, at the time of acquisition, all appro-
priate inquiry into the previous ownership and uses of the property consistent with
good commercial or customary practice in an effort to minimize liability." 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(35)(B) (1988). For suggestions as to what constitutes an appropriate inquiry
by a real estate purchaser, see Brown, supra note 12.
14. See Thaddeus Bereday, Contractual Transfers of Liability Under CERCLA
Section 107(E)(1): For Enforcement of Private Risk Allocations In Real Property
Transactions, 43 CASE WESTERN LAW REv. 161, 163 (1992); J. GORDON AnaucKLs,
ENVIRONmiENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 96-97 (1989).
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may still be open questions,15 but they are questions that point to-
ward the continued and growing importance of CERCLA in prop-
erty transactions.
The potential liability posed by CERCLA also has had an impact
on private land use and land use planning. No residential developer
wants to build over a potential Love Canal. Even the location of
industrial developments is influenced by potential clean-up liability.
An industry may prefer an area where no industrial activity ever has
occurred rather than an otherwise attractive site previously occu-
pied by some other industry.' 6 As the awareness of the reach of this
potential liability grows, as states enact their own clean-up responsi-
bilities acts, 7 and as the push continues to expand CERCLA and
related statutes to hitherto exempt industries and wastes, such as
those produced by oil field drilling,'" it seems inevitable that con-
cern over hazardous waste liability will become increasingly central
in shaping land transactions and in private land use planning
decisions.
The discussion so far has focused only on CERCLA. Add to
CERCLA wetlands protection' 9-or critical habitat designation
under the Endangered Species Act3-and consider their potential
impact both on land transactions and land use. Add new substan-
tive concepts, such as the scenic and environmental easements,2 '
and the environmental impact upon real estate law becomes still
15. See Bereday, supra note 14.
16. See Thomas R. Kline, Overview, in 2 ENvmorbmNTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY
xvii, xix (Allison P. Zabriskie ed., 1992-1993).
17. E.g., The New Jersey Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act (ECRA),
NJ. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13:1K-6 to 1K-13 (West 1991).
18. CERCLA specifically excludes petroleum and natural gas from its definition
of hazardous substances. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988). Similarly, regulations issued
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 9H 6901-
6992k (1988), exempt most wastes from oil and natural gas exploration and produc-
tion from being classified as hazardous. See, eg., 40 C.F.R. § 261A(b) (1991).
19. Under the Clean Water Act, a person wishing to deposit fill material into
waters of the United States, including wetlands, must obtain a permit from the Army
Corps of Engineers. 33 U.S.C. § 1344.
20. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988).
21. Section 1(1) of the Uniform Conservation Easement Act (UCEA), 12 U.L.A.
66, 70 (1981 & Supp. 1994), defines a conservation easement as:
[A] nonpossessory interest of a holder in real property imposing limitations
or affirmative obligations the purposes of which include retaining or pro-
tecting natural, scenic, or open-space values of real property, assuring its
availability for agricultural, forest, recreational, or open-use, protecting
natural resources, maintaining or enhancing air or water quality, or pre-
serving the historical, architectural, archaeological, or cultural aspects of
real property.
The Act has been adopted by sixteen states and the District of Columbia. 12 U.LA.
66 (1981 & Supp. 1994). Maine adopted the UCEA in 1985, but with some varia-
tions. See M. REv. STAT. Ar., tit. 33 §§ 476 to 479-B (West 1988). Many other
states have statutes that are similar to the UCEA.
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greater. One prediction that a property teacher can make to his law
students with some confidence is that if a student is practicing real
estate law five, ten, or fifteen years from now, he or she also will be
practicing environmental law.
B. Environmental Law and the International Practitioner
There has been a parallel development on the international front.
To an oil and gas lawyer, who has seen his field almost completely
internationalized within the last two decades, one of the striking de-
velopments within just the last five or six years has been how much
"greener" it has become. An oil or mining company that begins op-
erations abroad can no longer safely assume that all of its environ-
mental responsibilities end when it leaves North America.
Environmental law and environmental responsibilities also have be-
come internationalized.
While this development is not limited to the extractive industries,
it is especially apparent there. Other countries, including Third
World and developing countries, now routinely impose environmen-
tal restrictions on mining and petroleum companies, either in the
form of specific clauses in mining contracts negotiated with individ-
ual companies, or of general pollution-control legislation.' As a
practical matter, such requirements often may be vague, ignored, or
laxly enforced;' but their relatively recent appearance reflects at
least an incipient awareness of the importance of environmental
protection. This is the case even in developing countries where the
extractive industries traditionally have been viewed quite favorably
as producing both hard currency and employment and so have been
given the highest land-use priority.
Perhaps more importantly from the perspective of the practicing
lawyer, host country environmental requirements affect the struc-
ture of international transactions and their content. Regardless of
current enforcement, environmental restrictions cannot be ignored
in drafting agreements that are intended to govern parties' rights
and responsibilities over several decades.24 One example will serve
22. See, e.g., the contract clause in Brazil's 1979 Model Service Contract for On-
shore and Offshore Operations and the Seychelles Petroleum Mining (Pollution
Control Act of 1976), excerpted in INT'L PETRoLEUM TRANSACrIONS supra note 5,
at 566-68.
23. One commentator, who surveyed the petroleum arrangements in over 100
developing countries, has concluded that agreements tend to contain general refer-
ences to environmental protection, but that systematic and substantive requirements
are missing. Zhiguo Gao, International Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation
Agreements: A Comprehensive Environmental Appraisal, 12 J. ENERGY & NATURAL
RESOURCES L. 240, 249 (1994).
24. For example, the petroleum concession granted by Thailand has a term of 26
years, with a permissible renewal period of 10 years. Indonesia's production sharing
contract has a 30 year duration. Zhiguo Gao, Recent Trends and New Directions in
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to illustrate the point. Many countries now require that an oil com-
pany, upon discontinuing production, remove its installations and
perform some restoration work?5 If the oil field installations are on
shore, removal and restoration may pose no significant problem; but
if the oil field is beneath a deep-water area, such as the North Sea,
removal of drilling installations presents quite serious engineering
and financial challenges. Typically located miles from land, the pro-
duction platforms resemble small islands in size, and the cost of re-
moval is enormous. Even five years ago estimates of the cost of
removing drilling and production platforms from just the United
Kingdom segment of the North Sea ranged from £6 billion to £8
billion.26 From an accounting standpoint, the issue is whether
decommissioning costs should be recognized as a current expense of
production or whether recognition of decommissioning costs should
be delayed until the end of a well's life, when the "cost" of produc-
ing the last barrel of oil may then be £1 billion 2 7
As an environmental issue, accounting theory and private agree-
ments allocating decommissioning costs do not sound very sexy; but
to the private business person-and to the lawyer helping to struc-
ture the transaction-they are life or death. Does the tax code per-
mit treating future reclamation costs as current operational
expenses? Should a private agreement among joint participants in
such an off-shore venture require that each contribute periodically
to a reclamation fund?29 Does it make sense to set aside millions of
dollars or pounds in such a fund?"0 How can the private parties who
International Petroleum Exploration Agreements, 17 WoRLD COMPErT'oIN 109, 129
(1994). Depending upon the licensing round, development agreements granted by
the various countries bordering the North Sea may last for almost 50 years. See
INT'L PETRoLEuM TRANSACTIONS 321-33 (1993).
25. See, e.g., Paul McDade, The Petroleum Bilk The Removal of Offshore Instal-
lations and Pipelines [1986187],6 OIL & GAS L. & TAx. REv. 158 for a discussion of
the decommissioning requirements in the United Kingdom. Even developing coun-
tries that impose few environmental requirements upon foreign petroleum compa-
nies usually require at least some clean-up operations. See Gao, supra note 23. at
250.
26. INT'L PETROLEUM TRANSAcTIONS, supra note 5, at 545-46.
27. Id.
28. See eg., Catherine Redgwell, Abandonment and Reclamation Obligations in
the United Kingdom, 10 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 59,83-84 (1992) (discuss-
ing the United Kingdom tax); Hans J. Bull & Knut Kaasen, Abandonment and Rec-
lamation of Energy Sites: Norway, 10 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L 37, 42-43
(1992) (discussing the Norwegian system of government grants for decommissioning
and its relation to the Norwegian tax code); LRLC. §§ 162(a), 461(a), (h) (1988);
Treas. Regs. §§ 1.461-1(a)(1), (2) and 1.612-2(a); Rev. Rul. 80-182, 1980-2 C.B. 167
(dealing with removal of oil and gas well fixtures and offshore platforms).
29. See Ernest E. Smith, Techniques for Assuring Compliance with Abandonment
and Reclamation Requirement, ENERGY AND RESOURCES LAW '92, 293, 306 (1992)
for a discussion of agreements that establish such funds.
30. Although the operator invariably has primary responsibility for reclamation,
nonoperators may be secondarily liable. See e.g., Railroad Comm'n v. Olin Corp.,
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are not primarily responsible for operations make sure that the op-
erator, who is primarily responsible, performs the reclamation satis-
factorily and that they do not become ultimately liable at a time
when all income from the project has ceased? These are just a few
of the contract issues raised by a relatively minor and straightfor-
ward environmental requirement.
Mandatory reclamation also raises planning and land use issues.
One way to avoid excessive reclamation costs and concomitant legal
issues is to avoid excessive environmental impact. A relatively new
development in the extractive industries has been the promulgation
of environmental guidelines by international trade groups. For ex-
ample, the International Association of Geophysical Contractors re-
cently released draft guidelines3 containing both a general policy
statement of environmental responsibilities of their member compa-
nies and quite detailed provisions for conducting exploratory opera-
tions in various types of ecosystems, including rain forests, in order
to minimize impact.
In addition to the incipient "greening" of the domestic law of
Third World countries, there have been other developments that
have had even more profound effects on international business.
One has been the explosion of environmental multilateral treaties
and conventions, such as the International Convention on Civil Lia-
bility for Oil Pollution Damage,3" which imposes strict liability upon
the owner of an oil tanker if an oil spill occurs within the territorial
waters of a contracting state. Many other treaties are bilateral
agreements that deal with specific transboundary problems, such as
disposal of hazardous waste or water quality.33
Another development has been the attempted extraterritorial
reach of U.S. environmental laws. Extraterritorial application of
domestic law is hardly a new phenomenon, nor one that is necessar-
ily unique to the United States. It commonly is encountered in con-
nection with taxation, for many countries routinely tax their citizens'
foreign incomes. Two well known examples of U.S. statutes with
690 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. App. 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (nonoperators liable for costs of
controlling and plugging a gas well under Texas statute); Richard Beazley, Abandon-
ment of UKCS Installations: Security Against Default, 1 On. & GAS L. & TAX. REv.
6 (1986-87) (nonoperator liability under United Kingdom statute); Gunther Kuhne,
What Happens When the Operator Fails to Meet Its Obligations? ENERGY AND RE-
SOURCES LAW '92, 308 (1992) (detailed exposition of nonoperator liability imposed
through regulation, statute and judicial decision in various western European
countries).
31. Environmental Guidelines for Worldwide Geophysical Operations, excerpted
in INT'L PETROLEUM TRANSACrIONs 571-75.
32. 973 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 9 INrr'L LEGAL MATERIAL 45 (1970).
33. E.g., Agreement of Cooperation Between the United States of America and
the United Mexican States Regarding the 7f'ansboundary Shipments of Hazardous
Wastes and Hazardous Substances, 26 INT'L LEGAL MATERIAL 25 (1987).
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extraterritorial reach are the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,' which
provides criminal and civil penalties for American companies that
attempt to bribe foreign officials, and the Sherman Antitrust Act,'
which in some instances applies to anti-competitive conduct outside
the U.S. that is intended to affect commerce within the U.S.' What
is relatively new is the attempted extraterritorial application of do-
mestic environmental laws. The National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA),37 the Endangered Species Act (ESA),' the Clean Air Act
(CAA),39 the Clean Water Act (CWA),' and the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CER-
CLA)4' all have been argued to apply beyond our national bounda-
ries. For example, in Greenpeace USA v. Stone4 an environmental
organization attempted to enjoin the United States from transport-
ing hazardous chemicals from Germany to a Pacific atoll for storage
and disposal on the grounds that the Department of Defense
(DOD) had violated NEPA. Greenpeace argued that NEPA re-
quired DOD to prepare a comprehensive Environmental Impact
Statement covering all aspects of the transportation and disposal of
the chemicals. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife43 an environmental
group argued that Section 7 of the ESA, which prohibits actions by
federal agencies that jeopardize the continued existence of
threatened or endangered species, applies to action abroad as well
as domestically. Indeed, applicable regulations under the ESA had
reflected this position prior to their revision in 1986."
It is true that most of these attempts to extend U.S. environmen-
tal laws extraterritorially have been rebuffed. The point, however, is
not whether U.S. environmental regulations can be validly applied
abroad, or whether foreign environmental regulations provide ade-
quate environmental protections. The point, rather, is that environ-
mental regulations, whether effective or ineffective, have become
increasingly central to international business transactions and to
34. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -2 (1988).
35. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1988).
36. See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d
597 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d
Cir. 1945).
37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
38. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988).
39. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
40. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
41. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
42. 748 F. Supp. 749 (D. Hawaii 1990).
43. 112 S. CL 2130 (1992).
44. Id at 2135. Arguments for applying the Endangered Species Act extraterri-
torially and the problems that such an application would pose can be found in
George Cameron Coggins & John W. Head, Beyond Defenders.: Future Problems of
Extraterritoriality and Superterritoriality for the Endangered Species Act, 43 WASH.
U. . URB. & CONTEMP. L. 59 (1993).
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land use decisions. Indeed, whether teaching real estate law, domes-
tic oil, gas and mining law, or international business transactions, I
find myself advising my students of much the same thing: If you
practice law in the fields with which I am most familiar, a significant
part of your practice is going to be devoted to dealing with environ-
mental regulations.
II. OPPOSITION TO THE INTRUSION OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Although one of the most pronounced legal trends within the last
five years has been the decided "greening" of real estate, oil, gas,
and mining law, international transactions, and many other fields, a
second and much different phenomenon has emerged during this
same period: a strong opposition to this intrusion of environmental
regulation and protection. Significantly, the opposition on the inter-
national level parallels that on the national level.
A. The Domestic Property Rights Movement
Within the United States there has been an extraordinary resur-
gence of concern over the erosion of property rights, a concern that
is perhaps as high or higher than that produced by the New Deal
legislation of the 1930's. The clearest way in which this concern has
been evidenced is the growing number of challenges to environmen-
tal restraints as "takings" of private property under the United
States Constitution.45 At least one noted environmental law author-
ity has referred to claims based on private property rights as "consti-
tutional clouds over the current system of environmental law in the
United States."'46 If these claims are clouds, they are not likely to
dissipate any time soon. In fact, if past, pending, and threatened
litigation is any measure, the clouds are building into a real
northeaster.
The first clear sign that a storm might be brewing was the
Supreme Court's decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Coun-
cil.47 The "regulatory takings" issue did not, of course, begin with
Lucas,48 but that case brought it squarely to the attention of both
environmentalists and property rights advocates. The facts by now
are known fairly well. In 1986 Lucas bought two lots on a South
Carolina barrier island for just under $1,000,000, planning to de-
velop them for single-family homes similar to those on adjacent lots.
His plans were brought to an abrupt halt two years later when the
South Carolina Coastal Council, acting under the authority of the
45. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
46. Michael C. Blumm, Introduction, 2 Environmental Law Anthology xi, xv (Al-
lison P. Zabriskie ed., 1993).
47. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
48. Its lineage dates at least as far back as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's deci-
sion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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state's newly enacted Beachfront Management Act, established a
beach erosion line that was landward of Lucas's two lots. The stated
purpose of the act was environmental: to protect the beach from
erosion by preventing construction that would damage the dunes
and by allowing the dunes to be stabilized through the growth of
native plants. The effect of the Coastal Council's action on Lucas
was to bar all construction whatsoever on his million-dollar lots. In
dealing with Lucas's complaint, the United States Supreme Court
concluded that this action had effected a "regulatory" (and hence
compensable) taking of Lucas's property under the Fifth Amend-
ment. The Coastal Council's action fell into a category that nor-
mally requires the private property owner to be compensated
regardless of the public interest advanced in support of the regula-
tion: action that denies the landowner "all economically beneficial
or productive use of [his] land."49
Given the facts of the case and the narrow holding, Lucas should
not have caused environmentalists especially grave concern or in-
spired excessive euphoria among property rights advocates. Rela-
tively few environmental regulations deprive a landowner of "all
economically beneficial or productive use" of his or her land. Is Lu-
cas indicative of anything more than a holding on highly-specialized
facts?
It well may be. Some commentators believe that the Supreme
Court is becoming increasingly receptive to claims that governmen-
tal regulations, especially environmental regulations, constitute a
taking of private property.50 Lucas by itself may be no more than a
summer shower, but there are also other recent cases. These include
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n51 and Dolan v. City of
Tigard,52 holding that a state cannot condition a building permit
upon the landowner's granting a public easement or greenway
across part of her land, and First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,53 requiring the state
to compensate a landowner for a "temporary" taking when a land-
owner has been denied all economic use of his property for some
period of time. When all these cases are considered in the context
of regulations preventing development of wetlands or modification
of the critical habitat of an endangered species, the storm clouds of
private property rights thicken noticeably over the environmental
horizon.
In fact, it is already raining pretty hard in the lower courts. Under
traditional "takings" jurisprudence, a landowner may establish a
49. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. at 2893.
50. E.g., Blumm, supra note 46, at xi, xv.
51. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
52. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
53. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
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regulatory taking even though an environmental regulation does not
deprive the landowner of all economically viable uses of his prop-
erty. He may claim compensation successfully if the economic im-
pact on his land is severe and interferes with what the Supreme
Court has called "distinct investment-backed expectations." 4 In at
least four recent cases5" involving privately owned wetlands, the
United States Court of Claims has found that a landowner suffered
a compensable regulatory taking. One of these cases, Formanek v.
United States,56 illustrates the conflict between property rights and
environmental concerns. Over a six-year period the plaintiff and his
partners bought 112 acres upon which they planned to develop a
multi-lot industrial park. Since the 112 acres included ninety-nine
acres of wetlands, considerable filling was necessary before the pro-
ject could get underway. Unbeknownst to the plaintiff, however,
the ninety-nine acres of wetlands included part of the Savage Fen
Wetland Complex, an area that supported an unusual and rare com-
bination of wetland plants and was subject to the Clean Water Act.57
The Army Corps of Engineers refused to grant the plaintiff a permit
to fill the wetland, and the plaintiff successfully sued the Corps on
the theory that this action constituted a regulatory taking. Applica-
tion of the wetlands regulation had interfered with the plaintiff's
"investment backed expectations" and effected a severe economic
impact on the value of his land, decreasing it from $933,000 to
$112,000.58 Significantly, the fact that the Minnesota National Heri-
tage Program had made several offers to buy the land from the
plaintiffs, including one offer as high as $590,000, did not deter the
court from its conclusion. 9 The court held that the offer did not
establish that the land, as subject to the wetlands regulation, had a
"solid and adequate fair market value" 60 because the offer was "not
the product of negotiations between a willing buyer and seller under
no duress." 61
54. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978).
55. Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed.Cl. 37 (1994); Formanek v. United States, 26
CI. Ct. 332 (1992); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990),
motion to vacate judgment and dismiss complaint denied, 27 F.3d 1545 (Fed. Cir.
1994), aff'd, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United
States, 21 CI. Ct. 161 (1990); vacated and remanded 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
56. 26 Cl. Ct. 332 (1992).
57. Id at 333.
58. Id at 340.
59. Id at 334.
60. Id. at 340 (quoting Formanek v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 785, 797 (1989)
(quoting Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 1791 F.2d 893, 903 (Fed. Cir.
1986))).
61. Id (quoting Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 21 C. Ct. 161, 175
(1990)).
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Four decisions by the Court of Claims, which have met with a
mixed reception by the Federal Circuit on appeal,62 may not sound
like a storm warning to a Constitutional law scholar, but they should
to an environmentalist. There are approximately twenty additional
cases pending in the Court of Claims involving landowners' claims
that denial of a Clean Water Act Section 404 permit for filling pri-
vately-owned wetlands has resulted in a compensable taking.'
Moreover, private property claims are not limited to wetlands per-
mitting. The Endangered Species Act already has been challenged
once in federal court as accomplishing an uncompensated taking,64
and threats of suits are multiplying almost as fast as black flies in
June. For example, The Texas and Southwestern Cattle Raisers As-
sociation threatened suit if the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service at-
tempted to implement a proposal to designate portions of thirty-
three central Texas counties as the critical habitat of the golden-
cheeked warbler, a listed endangered species under the Endangered
Species Act.65 The basis for the threat is the ranchers' perception of
the consequences should their ranches be included within the war-
bler's critical habitat. They believe they not only will be prevented
from developing their land for residential, commercial, and retail
purposes, but even may be precluded from clearing brush and juni-
per trees in order to expand or improve grazing areas.6
It would be a mistake to dismiss these cases and threats of cases
on the ground that many of them-perhaps most of them-are le-
gally unsound, and that no matter how receptive the United States
Supreme Court may be to regulatory taking theory, the theory is
unlikely ever to reach as deeply as many of these plaintiffs hope it
will. Even if that practical legal analysis proves correct, the mere
concern that there may be constitutional infirmity in environmental
regulation will affect regulation. It already has. Faced with the
threat of lawsuits by both the ranchers' coalition and the Texas At-
torney General67 and with opposition by former Texas Governor
62. Compare Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (affirming lower court's decision), with Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United
States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (reversing and remanding decision).
63. See William J. Haynes II & Royal C. Gardner, The Value of Wetlands as lWet-
lands: The Case for Mitigation Banking, 23 ENVrL. L Rm,. 10261, 10262 (1993).
64. Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1988).
65. Letter from Tom Beard, President of the Texas and Southwestern Cattle
Raisers Association to TSCRA Members (Aug. 1, 1994) (on file with author).
66. See Federal Land Regulations Are Assailed, Environmentalists Say Groups
Are Overreacting, DALLAS MoaING NEWS, Aug. 24, 1994, at 21A, 26A, reporting a
statement by Bob Stallman, president of the Texas Farm Bureau, that if the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service designated approximately 800,000 acres as critical habitat of the
golden-cheeked warbler, he "would not be able to build a fence or cut down a cedar
tree on his property without first getting a permit from the federal government."
67. Office of Attorney General of the State of Texas, Morales To Sue Interior
Department If Additional Counties Designated As "Critical Habitat," (Aug. 24,
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Ann Richards, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service called off its study
of the golden-cheeked warbler's critical habitat.68 The United
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit almost certainly had
possible constitutional infirmity in mind when it ruled that regula-
tion under the Endangered Species Act effectively precluding a pri-
vate landowner from significantly modifying an area critical to the
survival of an endangered or threatened species was outside the in-
tended scope of the statute.69
Litigation is only one manifestation of the intensified concern
over private property, however. Agitation for legislative change is
another. Property advocacy groups have called for statutory modifi-
cations of wetlands regulation and of the Endangered Species Act.
In Texas, rural and agricultural groups formed a coalition called
Farmers and Ranchers for Property Rights to fight against govern-
ment regulation of their land, to oppose the Endangered Species
Act, and to seek additional state protection for property rights.7"
Politicians from both parties have joined the property rights band-
wagon. Texas Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison, a Republican, de-
nounced a proposed habitat conservation plan as forcing
landowners to pay "ransom" to build a house on their own prop-
erty.7' Texas Attorney General, Dan Morales, a Democrat, is at one
with the ranchers in opposing determination of golden-cheeked war-
bler habitat.72
The property rights movement certainly is not limited to Texas.
In at least a dozen states, including Maine, "Private Property Rights
Acts" have been introduced that would require compensation if
state regulation reduces the value of privately owned land by a spec-
ified percent.7 3 Similar legislation has been introduced into both
houses of Congress in the last two sessions. As this article was going
to print, the House of Representatives passed the "Private Property
Protection Act of 1995," introduced by Congressman Billy Tauzin, a
Democrat from Louisiana, and a group of bi-partisan co-sponsors.
The bill would require compensation to property owners if federal
regulations deprive them of twenty percent or more of the fair mar-
1994) (press release on file with author) [hereinafter Attorney General Press
Release].
68. U.S. to Halt Work on Designating Central Texas Land for Bird Habitat, DAL-
LAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 28, 1994, at 24A.
69. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Oregon v. Babbitt, 30
F.3d 190, 193 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
70. See Stefanie Scott, Organizations Heat up Flap over Golden.cheeked Warbler,
SAN ANTONIO ExPREss, Aug. 24, 1994.
71. See Ralph K. M. Haurwitz, Revised BCCP Is up for Public Debate at Hearing
Today, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Jan. 31, 1995, at B2.
72. Attorney General Press Release, supra note 67.
73. See, e.g., AN ACT TO REQUIRE THE STATE AND POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS TO
PAY PROPERTY OWNERS WHEN REGULATIONS LOWER THE VALUE OF PROPERTY
BY MORE THAN 50%, L.D. 170 (117th Legis. 1995) (presented by Senator Hanley).
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ket value of their property. If the diminution in value exceeds fifty
percent, the property owner would have the option of requiring the
federal government to buy the property. In the Senate, Phil
Gramm, Republican from Texas, introduced a bill similar to the
"Private Property Rights Restoration Act" that he had proposed in
the 1994 Congressional session.74 Other property rights bills that
have been proposed during the last two sessions include a bill by
Senator Robert Dole, Republican from Kansas, that would require
federal agencies to assess the impact of proposed regulations on
property rights before issuing the regulations."
At this juncture "you don't have to be a weatherman to know
which way the wind is blowing." The claims that environmental reg-
ulations are abrogating property rights already have reached gale
force, and the storm system is gathering strength. Property owners
and their spokespeople see infringed a right as firmly protected by
the Constitution as freedom of speech and freedom of religion.
They are moving on all legal fronts to protect it. Whether tradi-
tional property rights actually sweep as broadly as their advocates
claim is not as important as the existence of the widespread grass-
roots movement that supports the advocacy. That movement-
whether we decry it or applaud it-is going to be with us into the
next century.
B. Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources
Domestic opposition to environmental regulation that intrudes
upon property rights has an international parallel. Most commenta-
tors appear to analyze the issue as a collision between United States
environmental legislation and the "free trade" movement, exempli-
fied by multi-national treaties like the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade (GATT) and regional agreements like the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).76 NAFTA, for exam-
ple, was widely opposed by environmentalists on the ground that it
would cause a flight of American and Canadian businesses to Mex-
ico, where there would be far more freedom to pollute. The most
widely cited conflict between free trade and American environmen-
tal laws, however, is the dispute between the United States and
74. See H.R. 925, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a) (1995) (stating that "it is the policy
of the federal government that no law or agency action should limit the use of pri-
vately owned property so as to diminish its value) and S. 145, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 29(a) (1995) (stating that a cause of action accrues if government regulation "re-
stricts, limits, or otherwise takes a right to real property").
75. For a description of the property rights bills introduced in Congress in 1994,
see generally Rod Smith, Gramm Introduces 'Strongest' Bill to Protect Property,
FEEDSTUFFS: THE NVKLY. NEWSPAPER FOR AGP.musnEss, Sept. 5, 1994, at 1, 4.
76. See, eg., Peter Behr, Environmentalists Find NAFTA Is No Easy Call; Na-
tional Groups Remain Sharply Divided, WASH. Posr, Aug. 24, 1993, at Cl; Jessica
Mathews, The Great Greenless GATT, VASH. Posr, Apr. 11, 1994, at A19.
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Mexico over imported Mexican yellowfin tuna, banned by the
United States as violating legislated import restrictions.
The tuna dispute centers on the Marine Mammal Protection
Act,77 which reflects United States opposition to the incidental kill-
ing of large numbers of dolphins in commercial tuna fishing. As
originally enacted in 1972, the Act mandated regulations imposing a
limit on the number of dolphins the United States tuna fishing fleet
may kill.78 The practical effect of the legislation was to discourage
the use of purse-seine nets that encircle and ultimately trap and kill
not only schools of tuna but also the dolphins that swim with them.
Because of the Act, the American tuna fishing fleet turned primarily
to long-line fishing, baited and directed specifically at tuna. Foreign
fishing fleets, however, continued to use the purse-seine method. In
1988 the Marine Mammal Protection Act was amended,79 this time
imposing a ban on imports of tuna from foreign tuna fleets that took
dolphins in excess of the standards imposed upon the United States
fleet.
From the standpoint of traditional free trade analysis, the em-
bargo provision was significant because it had nothing to do with the
quality of tuna imported into the United States; rather, it was aimed
entirely at the process by which the tuna was caught. If caught
through means considered by United States standards to be environ-
mentally unsound, wasteful, or inhumane, the tuna was banned, re-
gardless of the quality of the product itself. The statutory goal,
presumably, was to pressure foreign fisheries that wanted access to
the profitable United States tuna market to follow the lead of the
United States American tuna fishing fleet and abandon the use of
purse-seine nets.
In 1990 the United States imposed the Marine Mammal Protec-
tion Act ban on Mexican yellowfin tuna.8 0 Mexico responded by
filing a complaint under GATT."' Several holdings by the GATT
panel in its ruling were especially unsettling to environmentalists.
77. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
78. 16 U.S.C. § 1381 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
79. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2).
80. The ban was imposed pursuant to court order. Earth Island Inst. v. Mos-
bacher, 746 F. Supp. 964, 976 (N.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd, 929 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991).
In a later case, Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 785 F. Supp. 826 (N.D. Cal. 1992),
modified, 28 F.3d 76 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 509 (1994), the govern-
ment was ordered to identify all nations that import yellowfin tuna and also export
yellowfin tuna to the United States and to require each such nation to provide certi-
fication and proof that it has acted to prohibit importation of tuna banned from
direct importation into the United States. Id. at 836.
81. A history of the specific actions taken by the Secretary of Commerce and
Customs Service to effectuate the ban ordered by the court can be found in Restric-
tions on Imports of Tuna, GATI Doc. DS21/R, reprinted in, GENERAL AGREEMENT
ON TARIFFS AND TRADE BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS, at
§§ 2.7-2.8 (Supp. 39 1993) [hereinafter BISD].
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One was the conclusion that neither GATT Article XX(b), which
permits measures "necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life
or health," nor GATT Article XX(g), which permits a country to
take measures "related to the conservation of an exhaustible natural
resource," authorizes a country to impose trade restrictions in order
to pressure other countries to change their health, sanitation, or en-
vironmental policies.' According to the panel, GATT permitted
countries to implement trade measures protective of health, sanita-
tion, safety, and environmental preservation only within their own
jurisdiction.83 The United States thus could ban tuna that did not
meet the sanitary standards required of United States tuna. It pre-
sumably could ban a car that did not meet the emissions standards
required of American cars. But it could not ban an acceptable prod-
uct merely because it was produced by methods impermissible in the
United States. It could not ban sanitary tuna merely because the
tuna were caught by a process that ensnared dolphins.
To many environmentalists, the GATT panel decision in the yel-
lowfm tuna dispute sounded the same warnings on the international
level as Lucas did on the domestic level. Extrapolating from the
GATT panel's reasoning, environmentalists along with human rights
activists, trade unionists, and many others concluded that the United
States could not, for example, ban textiles produced cheaply by for-
eign factories that employ primarily nine-year-old children and
dump their excess dyes into rivers and territorial seas.' There is
considerable validity in that equation of the yeilowfin tuna decision
with the Lucas case, not because the GATr panel decision opposes
free trade to American environmentalism but because the GATI'
decision opposes national sovereignty to American environmen-
talism.
To an American property teacher looking at the international
scene, national boundaries are the functional equivalent of lot lines.
In fact territorial sovereignty sometimes is established through use
of some of the same concepts that become familiar to first-year
property students: prescription, accretion, and voluntary agree-
ment.'s Moreover, international boundaries frequently are drawn
just as inappropriately from a geographic or ecological standpoint as
are private lot lines. More to the point, the American property
owners' reliance on Constitutional rights has a strong echo in the
developing countries' reliance on the 1963 United Nations General
Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Re-
82. Id. at 197-201.
83. IL
84. See, e.g., Mitchell Zuckoff, Free Trade, Human Rights Clash over GATT, Bos-
TON SUNDAY GLOBE, Oct. 30, 1994, at 77.
85. See, eg., G ARD VoN GtAHN, LAw AMioNG NATIONS 367-76 (6th rev. ed.
1992).
MAINE LAW REVIEW
sources.86 The Resolution, vigorously debated and finally over-
whelmingly adopted, expressly recognizes "the inalienable right" of
every country to take charge of and dispose of its own natural re-
sources in accordance with its own perception of what is best for its
own national interest.' The Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty
is certainly one of the most important of the successive UN resolu-
tions' establishing the right at international law of each sovereign
nation to be free of foreign meddling in their internal affairs.
In that context, one can examine the reasoning of the GATT
panel. The United States ban on Mexican-caught tuna was im-
proper not only because it interfered with free trade (after all the
United States was not trying to require the Mexican fishing fleet to
do anything the United States American fishing fleet is not required
to do), but also because it infringed upon Mexican national sover-
eignty.89 A repeatedly expressed concern of Mexico and some in-
terested third parties was that the United States should not be
allowed to use its trade policies to pressure other countries to adopt
its social or environmental goals.90 Such trade requirements in-
truded too deeply upon Mexico's national sovereignty and Mexico's
right to decide whether to preserve dolphins or let them drown in
Mexican fishermen's nets.
In a sense the GATT panel decision transforms dolphins into the
international equivalent of the golden-cheeked warbler. The Texas
rancher firmly believes he has a constitutional right to clear all the
juniper trees from his land, without interference from U.S. Fish and
86. U.N.G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), reprinted in 2 Int'l Legal Material 223 (1963).
87. The Resolution was adopted in the General Assembly by a vote of 87 to 2,
with twelve countries abstaining.
88. United Nations Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Or-
der, U.N.G.A. Res. 3201 (1974), reprinted in 13 Int'l Legal Material 715 (1974);
United Nations Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, U.N.G.A. Res.
3281 (1975), reprinted in 14 Int'l Legal Material 251 (1975).
89. The extent to which § 1371(a)(2) of the Marine Mammal Protection Act (16
U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1988-1992)), was explicitly designed to pressure other coun-
tries to adopt dolphin-protective regulations similar to those of the United States is
clear from the language of § 1371(a)(2)(B):
[In the case of yellowfin tuna harvested with purse seines in the eastern
tropical Pacific Ocean, and products therefrom, to be exported to the
United States, [the Secretary] shall require that the government of the ex-
porting nation provide documentary evidence that -
(i) the government of the harvesting nation has adopted a regulatory
program governing the incidental taking of marine mammals in the course
of such harvesting that is comparable to that of the United States; and
(ii) the average rate of that incidental taking by the vessels of the har-
vesting nation is comparable to the average rate of incidental taking of
marine mammals by United States vessels in the course of such harvesting
90. See, e.g., BISD, supra note 81, §§ 3.31, 3.35, 3.48, 4.27. The GATT panel's
decision reflected a similar concern. Id. §§ 5.27, 5.32.
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Wildlife Service bureaucrats who see the warbler threatened with
extinction by elimination of its habitat. Mexico-and other devel-
oping nations-believe just as firmly that they have an inalienable
right under international law to establish their own environmental
and social goals, without interference from America or American
environmentalists.
III. CONCLUSION
Whereas the increased centrality of environmental law raises emi-
nently practical issues for the practitioner, especially the practitioner
who is concerned with developing, using, or facilitating transactions
in domestic or international real estate, the opposition to environ-
mental regulation raises questions not only of practical concern but
also eminently theoretical. On the international level, what is the
effect of Principle Twenty-One of the Stockholm Declaration, which
recognizes the sovereign right of each nation to pursue its own envi-
ronmental policies but also imposes the responsibility not to cause
damage to the environment of other states or areas beyond the lim-
its of national jurisdiction? To what extent is there a developing
customary law of the environment that is or will be as binding on
nations as any other doctrine of public international law doctrine?
The domestic property rights movement raises equally serious
questions. The constitutional concept of regulatory taking is still far
from clear, but there is an even more fundamental question of the
meaning of property rights. Is Professor Eric Freyfogle of Illinois
Law School correct in suggesting it is time to re-think the concept of
land ownership?9' Is it time to think of property rights in terms of
the ecosystem of which a tract is by nature an inextricable part and
to recognize that in terms of real estate development a wetland is
not the same as a dry field or that trees growing on a steep slope,
where they are essential to prevent erosion, are not the same as
trees growing on flat land? Would it be desirable, or even feasible,
to develop property concepts that take into account the natural dif-
ferences among tracts of land? Or are the advocates of expanded
property rights correct? Are such rights as sweepingly absolute as
freedom of speech and as fully protected by the Constitution? If
they are not that absolute, what are their limits, and how far may an
agency intrude on them in formulating and enforcing regulations?
These are issues that will be with us to the end of the decade-and
well beyond.
91. See Eric T. Freyfogle, Owning the Wolf Green Politic.s: Property Rights, Ecol-
ogy Rights, DssE, r 481, 487 (1994).

